Abstract
Introduction
In some cases, the sole purpose for carrying a mobile computer is to allow others to quickly locate the carrier (e.g. an active badge location system). In most cases, however, people carry mobile computers in ordvr to send and receive information. While this may include messages from other users who are trying to contact them, it is not necessary, in general, to locate someone in order to contact that person. Moreover, it IS common for users of communications networks to desire privacy. The focus of our work is on providing mechanisms for preserving privacy while permitting mobile communication. 
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In designing a system which preserves privacy for mobile users, we found it useful to partition privacy into three semi-independent components. The first is content privacy which is preserved if an attacker1 is unable to extract the plain-text of the data sent from one computer to another. Content privacy can be maintained through the proper use of message encryption and signatures.
Even if the data portion of a message is encrypted, an attacker may be able to obtain useful information. By observing the addressing information attached to messages, the attacker may be able to determine who is communicating with whom. Since the network needs to have some means of getting messages to their intended recipients, addressing information can not simply be encrypted along with the message data. One way to solve this problem is to send messages through intermediary computers which secretly pass messages from one computer to another (an example of this is a MIX-network [6, 151 which will be discussed later in this paper). However, in a mobile network, it is possible to take advantage of the computers' mobility to design a more efficient protocol to hide this information from an attacker than is possible in a static network. In section 5, we will present such a protocol.
The third type of privacy is location privacy. Just as with cellular telephones, many people will soon begin to carry mobile computers with them wherever they go. While the users of these computers will wish to be able to receive messages from others a t any time, they will not want others to be able to locate them. In addition to determining who is communicating with whom, an attacker may attempt to use traffic analysis to electronically "stalk', users. As we will show later, a MIX-network can be used by a computer that wishes Insecure Send f Insecure Read *-k to send a message while hiding its location.
While a MIX-network can also be used to allow a computer to receive a message while hiding its location, it is not very efficient. In section 7, we will present a technique, developed by the authors, which will allow a computer to read from a shared memory in such a way that an attacker will be unable to determine which piece of information is being read and in section 8 we will show how this protocol can be used to create a message service which will allow mobile computers to read messages without revealing their location. The message service and the protocols for interacting with it are depicted in figure 1.
Related work
Message encryption and signatures are essential to all security and privacy schemes. There are two basic types of encryption schemes, symmetric and asymmetric. In a symmetric (secret key) scheme, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption. In most cases, the secret key is known to a pair (or group) of communicating parties and kept hidden from all outsiders. While there are many different secret key encryption schemes, the most well known is DES [lo] . In an asymmetric (public key) scheme, the encryption and decryption keys are distinct. In addition, it is infeasible for someone who only knows the encryption key to determine the value of the decryption key. In most cases, the encryption (public) key is made widely available while the decryption (private) key is known only to a single user [its owner). An example of a public key scheme is RSA [18] . As with most public key encryption schemes, RSA can also be used to sign messages. Messages are signed using the decryption key and verified using the encryption key. The details of message encryption and signatures are beyond the scope of this paper (see ( There are several papers which describe protocols for maintaining the unlinkability of message senders and recipients. The concept of a MIX-network was introduced by David Chaum in [6]. A NIX-network takes in a batch of messages and scrambles them so that an attacker can not match incoming messages with outgoing messages. There are several other papers describing variations of the origmal scheme [ll, 12, 13 , IS]. The protocols in [6, 111 have security problems which were corrected in [14, 151.
In [7] , David Chaum presents an information theoretically secure technique for preserving [.he unlinkability of the sender and recipient of a message. This paper describes a protocol for creating a virtual network in which computers can send messages anonymously. Every computer can read every message (although they may be encrypted), but no computer is able to determine the sender of the message. Since messages are broadcast t o every computer, recipient anonymity is also guaranteed. While this technique is secure, it requires that every computer send and receive a large volume of data as well as share a large amount of secret data. This technique is adso not well suited for mobile computers which may freiquently disconnect from the network.
In [4], Brassard, Crepeau, and Robeit present a technique which allows a computer to read from a database without revealing which piece of information it is reading. In addition, it guarantees that the reading computer will only be able to read onc piece of information. In the protocol, the entire coxitents of the database is transferred to the reader in an encrypted form. The reader and the database then engage in a zero-knowledge protocol to enable the wader to decrypt one of the database entries. Since our protocol does not limit the amount of information that a reader can acquire, our memory service could be implemented by simply sending the entire contents of memory unencrypted. In section 7, we will present a protocol which satisfies our more limited requirements which has a small bandwidth overhead.
There has been some work in the area of privacy for mobile computers. In [2, 3, 51, protocols are presented which encrypt messages that are sent along wireless links thus preventing an attacker from using the contents of these messages to locate users. The main goal of these papers is to limit the computational overhead of the mobile computers. While the protocols in these papers will maintain the unlinkability of message senders and recipients as well as the location privacy of mobile computers, they assume that the static network is secure. In this paper, we will present protocols which are resilient to attacks on the static network.
System model

Mobile computers
The system consists of a set of mobile computers which are assumed to be anonymous by default. By this we mean that if every mobile computer were to send and receive the same sequence of signals, then no attacker could determine the identity of any computer. In other words, the only information an attacker can use to determine the identity of a mobile computer is any information that it can infer from the sequence of messages that the mobile computer sends and receives. Using this assumption, we will be able to demonstrate that our system preserves privacy by showing that a mobile computer does not send or receive any messages that might provide an attacker with information about the computer's identity.
Base stations
Mobile computers communicate by sending messages to, and receiving messages from, base stations2.
A mobile computer is said to be in the area of a base station if it is able to communicate with that base station3. A mobile computer sends a message in the same way as a static computer. It attaches a header to the message with the destination address and then forwards the message to the nearest base station which will route the message towards its destination.
When a mobile computer wishes to send a query for 21n a wireless network, a base station is a network router that has a wireless connection.
31n the future, when we refer to the location of a mobile computer, we will mean the area of the base station with which it i H connected.
which it expects a response4, it must use an RPC. The request will be sent t o the appropriate server and the server will respond by sending its reply message to the base station from which the query originated. If the mobile computer moves to another base station before the reply arrives then it must re-send its request5.
The network
The network consists of a set of static computers and a set of communications links. The static computers are the base stations, the routers, and any servers that will be discussed later in the paper. We assume that the communications links and the routers can be read by an attacker, but the attacker is unable to modify or delete any of the messages. We also assume that timestamps and nonces are used as appropriate to prevent message replay attacks. Servers, on the other hand, are considered to be secure unless specified as being corrupt. An attacker can read messages that go into or come out of a correct server but does not have access to the contents of the server's memory.
Throughout this paper, we assume that servers, both correct and corrupt, do not crash or behave maliciously. While techniques have been developed for implementing services which can handle crash failures or a limited number of malicious failures, fault tolerance is beyond the scope of this paper. Techniques for creating fault tolerant services can be found in [17] .
The message service
The message service is used to send messages to mobile computers. Sending a message to a mobile computer involves two steps. First, the sender attaches a labet to the message and sends it to the message service. Next, the intended recipient, upon discovering that the message is available, requests the message from the message service. The reason for this approach is twofold. First, it provides a means for computers to anonymously receive messages. Second, it allows one computer to send a message to another computer even if the second computer is not currently connected to the network. As will be shown later, most of the labels will be chosen randomly. Therefore, labels should be large enough so that the probability of two messages having the same label is acceptably small7. All messages must be of the same length. Messages longer than the standard length must be fragmented and then re-assembled by the recipient. The specific means of choosing labels for messages as well as the protocols for sending messages to, and retrieving messages from, the message service are vital to providing privacy and will be discussed in detail later.
Content privacy
A conversation between two computers, p and q, begins with one of the computers, say p , sending an initiation message to the other computer. Since secret key encryption is, in general, much more efficient than public key encryption, messages sent between p and q should be encrypted using a secret key. However, since p and q do not share any secret information before the initiation message is sent, some form of key exchange must be used to generate the secret key. A simple solution is to have the initiator, TI, generate a secret key, K,, and encrypt K , with q's public key, K q . The initiation message can then be Kq(Kd),K,(m) where m is any information that p wishes to send to q.
The initiator, p , can look up q's public key in a trusted authentication service8. As long asp trusts the authentication service, It will know that q, and only q, will be able to read the initiation message. As written above, however, the initiation message provides q with no way of verifying that the initiation message came from p . In some cases, the initiating computer's user may wish to remain anonymous and the receiving camputer's user may not be interested in authenticating the initiator. For example, one may wish to call an airline to find out about available flights. In this case, the airline may not be interested in authenticating the caller unless the caller tries to book a reservation. In many cases, someone receiving an initiation message may not want to send any messages to the initiator unless thc identity of the initiator has braen authenticated. To accomplish this, the initiator may receive a certificate from the authentication service. The certificate will be a signature, by the authentication service, of p's public key (i.e. 
Unlinkability of sender and recipient
Since mobile computers are anonymous by default, the relationship between senders and recipients can be hidden by carefully choosing message labeds. Labels can be divided into two basic categories. Label 1 is public if it is known to every user (i.e. available in a public directory) and private if it is known only to the sender and the intended recipient of the message.
As in the previous section, a conversation between two mobile computers, p and q, begins when one of the computers, say p , sends an initiation message to the other computer. Since p and q do not share any secret information before p sends the initiation message, the only (feasible) way for p to send a message to q is to use a public label for q (which can be founil in an authentication service along with q's public kfby). So, an initiation message (either the authenticated or unauthenticated version from the previous section) should be sent to q by attaching q's public label to the message and then sending the message to the message service.
Since the initiation message contains q's public label in plain-text, an attacker will be able to determine that an initiation message was sent to q. However, the initiation message does not contain any (unencrypted) information that would allow an attacker to determine that p sent the message. Since p's identity remains secret (to all excepi, possibly q), an attackxr will not be able to determine that p and q are communicating with each other.
In order to maintain this privacy, p's identity must remain secret for the remainder of the conversation.
In order to accomplish this, p can generate a random return "address" label, T~, and send this la.be1 to q in the initiation message. If T~ is encrypted, then only p and q will know its value thus making T~ a private label. This label can then be used by q to send a message to p without an attacker being able to determine that p is the intended recipient of the message.
In order to further reduce the amount of information that an attacker might be able to infer from messages sent between p and q (such as the number of messages that q exchanged with its secret communicating party), each subsequent message (from both p gThe notation { m ) K _~ signifies the signature of m using a's private key which is m, KT' ( h ( m ) ) where h is a one-way hash function.
and q ) should contain a new randomly generated return "address" label.
Location privacy while sending a message
In the previous two sections, we assumed that both parties wished to maintain privacy. We made this assumption since it is impossible to prevent an attacker from obtaining the identities of the participants or the contents of the messages in a conversation if the attacker is in collusion with one of the conversation's participants (if the conversation initiator does not identify itself to the other participant, then the attacker can only acquire participant information by colluding with the initiator). On the other hand, p should be able to prevent q from determining its location even if p and q are engaged in a conversation.
If p trusts q (i.e. believes that q will not attempt to locate it or does not mind being located by q ) , then it is easy for p to maintain location privacy. Since, as described in the previous section, p does not include ang (unencrypted) information about its identity in the messages that it sends to q, only q would be able to identify p as; the message sender. Thus, an outsider will be able to determine that a message was sent from a certain location, but only q will know that p sent the message.
X f p wishes t o hide its location from q, then p must work to hide the location from which it sends its messages. One possible solution to this problem is to use a MIX-network IS, 151 which takes batches of messages and scrambles them so that it is impossible to determine which message came from where (see figure 2).
The static network contains a set of w MIXes each having its own public key pair. We assume that at most t < w of the MIXes will be corruptedlO. In order to send a message, a mobile computer chooses t + 1 of the MIXes (call them M I , M2,. . . , Mt+l) and encrypts the message as follows:
l ( Z , m , S ) . . . ,M3:I,M2)
In the above equation, 1 is the message label, m is the encrypted message, K M~, . . . , K M , +~ are public keys of MI,. . . , Mt+l, and S is the address, of a server (the final destination of the message). (As is explained l U A aerver is corrupted if an attacker is able to read the contents of the server's memory or knows the server's private key. As was mentioned earlier, we are assuming in this paper that servers do not fail. However, all of the services described in this paper could be designed t o handle a limited number of crash 01 malicious failures 0 no in [6, 151, the above message must be peppered with random data after each encryption step in order to prevent active attacks on the MIX-network).
Each MIX reads in a block of messages, decrypts them, removes the random data, reorders the messages in some random fashion, and then sends each message to the next MIX in the chain or to a server. It is assumed that an attacker, due to the decryption and reordering steps, will be unable to match the incoming messages of a MIX with the outgoing messages unless it has corrupted the MIX. Since an attacker is unable to follow the path of a message that goes through an uncorrupted MIX and at least one of the t + 1 MIXes is uncorrupted, the attacker will be unable to follow the path of the message from the base station to the server.
A memory service with a blinded read operation
Just as the protocol of section 5 does not hide the location of the sender of a message from the message's intended recipient, the protocol also does not protect the recipient from the sender. Mobile computers must also be able to receive initiation messages which use public labels. One way to solve this problem is to use the MIX-network. A mobile computer wishing to receive a message would send a request message, through the MIX-network, to a message repository. The request message would include an anonymous wturn address [6, 12, 151 which could be used by the message repository to send the response (via the MIXnetwork).
The problem with the above technique is that the mobile computer must inform the message repository of the label in which it is interested. If the label is public or if the message repository is in collusion with the message sender (and the sender knows the identity of the intended recipient) then the message repository will know the identity of the requesting computer. Since the mobile computer may reveal its identity by sending the request message, it must hide the location from which it sends the message. While this method will guarantee location privacy for the recipient, it is very expensive.
An alternative is for the mobile computer to send request messages that do not contain any information which would allow the message repository to identify the requester (thus eliminating the need for the mobile computer to hide the location from which it sent the message). In designing a protocol to achieve this goal, our main objectives were to minimize the computational and bandwidth overhead involved (especially for the mobile computers).
In this section, we will describe a protocol for a replicated shared memory which will allow a computer (whether mobile or not) to perform a blinded read operation (one in which an attacker is unable to determine which position in memory is being read). In the next section, we will modify this protocol for use as a message repository for mobile computers.
A memory service consists of a set of n memory servers each of which has an array of m cells labeled
As in the previous section, we will assume that at most t <: n of the servers will be corrupted. 
Reading from memory
The technique for reading from memory is similar in nature to secret sharing. The requesting computer generates a set of t + 1 questions and sends each question to a different server. Just as in secret sharing, an attacker that is able to obtain at most t of the questions/answers will be unable to determine the secret. However, since the nature of the secret information is different in our scheme, secret sharing techniques are not appropriate for this problem.
For this section, we will assume that only read operations are performed and that the contents of the servers' memories are the same. A computer wishing to read from memory should create t random bitvectors of length m. Next, it should create a t + lSf bit-vector by exclusive-oring the t random bit-vectors and then flipping the pth bit (in order to read cell p ) .
This will create a set of t + 1 bit-vectors that, when exclusive-ored together, will yield the bit-vector .Zp:
An example of such a set is shown in figure 4. Using these bit-vectors, the contents of cell M b ] can be ob-tained using the protocol in figure 3. While it is not shown in the figure, the bit-vectors VI, V2 
. CB V,'[i]
is equally likely to be 0 or 1 whether it is the position being read or not, the attacker gains no information about which cell is being read.
Sparse bit-vectors
As was shown in the previous section, if the bits in the random bit-vectors are truly chosen at random (i.e. each bit is equally likely to be either a 0 or a 1), then an attacker that sees at most t of the vectors will gain no information about the position being queried. However, using such a bit-vector can be computationally expensive for the memory servers if the memories have a large number of cells or if the cells are large (in the next section, each cell will contain a message).
One way t o reduce the amount of work necessary to compute a response is t o create random bit-vectors with fewer 1's. Instead of setting each bit to 1 with probability f, each bit could be set t o 1 with a probability cp < f. This will decrease the computation time but will increase the amount of information that an attacker can infer. The value for cp must, therefore, be chosen carefully.
In order to determine a good value for cp, we should look at the set of bit-vectors from an attacker's point of view to determine how much information the attacker can infer. We will assume the worst case scenario in which the attacker has acquired t of the t 4-1 bitvectors, one of which is the t + 1" vector. Let's call the vectors that the attacker knows V, ', V i , . . . , 6' and the bit-vector that it doesn't know V". Say that the client is reading the value in cell p. In order to compute the information that an attacker can infer, we will need the following values:
Due t o the way that bit-vectors are created, we know that V" = C e I p . Therefore, we can compute the a posteriori probability that i = p as: a priori probability that V" = C @ 1; m-1 a priori probability that V" = C @ Ij j=O The a priori probability that VI' = C @ Ii, for each i , can be computed as follows:
In this case, Ish1 = IS01 -1 and l S i l = IS11 + 1.
From this we can conclude that the a priori probability that V" = C e 1; is $sll+l(l -cp)lsol-l.
In this case, ISAl = IS01 + 1 and = I S 1 1 -1.
From this we can conclude that the a priori probability that V" = C @ Using the above formulas, the a posteriori proba- Therefore, we can estimate 15' 01
In figure 5 we show the values for Pi and IS,( for different values of 'p for a memory with 1024 cells (the values for P i and were computed using the formulas above to estimate ISil). In the case of 9 = h, there is a 99% chance that p f S 1 and we can expect that IS11 11.22. While there is a chance that p is among the approximately 1012.78 positions in S O , it is very unlikely. So, while seeing t of the t + 1 vectors does not allow the attacker to rule out any of the positions entirely (for 0 < cp c l ) , if 9 is relatively small (or large), the attacker will be able to extract a relatively small group of positions such that the cell being read is highly likely to be in that group. and IS11 = (1 -9 ) + (~( m -1).
Writing to memory
The protocol in figure 3 assumes that the contents of each server's memory will be the same. If the responses to the bit-vectors are computed using cell values that differ from server to server, the computed value for the desired cell will be incorrect. There are two possible ways that the above situation could occur. The first is if a read operation is performed concurrently with a write operation. The second is if a client performing a write opwation sends different values to different servers or fads to inform some servers of the write operation. In order to prevent the first problem, all operations should be sent to the memory servers using a totally ordered multicast. For read operations, the t + 1 bit-vrctors should be bundled together and sent as one message (since each bit-vector will be encrypted using a different secret key, each server will only be able to read the bitvector intended for it even though it will receive all of the bit-vect om).
If it is necessary to guard against a malicious client (or perhaps a malicious server), then the totally ordered multicast must be tolerant to such behavior. The multicast protocol in [17] ensures that every correct server will receive the same set of messages in the same order thus preventing a malicious process from corrupting memory in this fashion".
Retrieving a message
The message service acts as intermediate storage for messages intended for mobile computers (as shown in figure 1 ). Messages are sent to the service either directly or through a series of MIX servers and are eventually retrieved by the intended recipient. In this section, we will show how to use the memory service of the previous section to implement a message service which will enable blinded read operations.
Messages are sent to the servers using a totally ordered multicast (as was described in section 7.2). At each server, arriving messages are placed in a list in the order in which they are delivered. This list is stored in a series of tables each of which holds m messages ~~ "Since the memory, as described, does not contain any access controls, an attacker may still cause problems by writing bad values.
(i.e. the i f h message delivered is stored in table (i -1) div m in cell (i -1) mod m). There is a tradeoff that must be considered when choosing a table size. First, the amount of effort needed to read a cell from a table increases as m increases (the client must create and encrypt bit-vectors of length m and the servers must decrypt the bit-vectors and exclusive-or together qm messages). In addition, mobile computers must wait until a table has filled before reading the messages in that table. Therefore, as m increases, the time between when a message arrives at the message service and when it can be read from the service increases.
On the other hand, as will be described later, as m increases, the amount of privacy increases for computers that read from the table.
Once a table has been filled, mobile computers may read the messages from that table. In order to enable message readhg, a digest of the table's contents is created and sent to all of the mobile computers.
The digest of a table is h(Zo), h(Zl), . . . , h(lm-l) where lo, 11 . . . , L -1 are the labels attached to the messages in each position of the table and h is a hash function.
Since every mobile computer will need to see the digest for every table, table digests are broadcast to mobile computers. Once a table is filled and its digest computed, the digest is sent to all of the base stations (using a multicast protocol for the static network).
Upon receipt, each base station broadcasts the digest over its wireless link. Some of the mobile computers will not receive the broadcast (for example, those that are disconnected from the network). Therefore, the base stations will also maintain a local copy of the digest and resend it a~ necessary to ensure that every mobile computer receives the digest (see [l, 81 for more information on multicasting in mobile networks).
Reading from a table
Each mobile computer will have a list of message labels in which it is interested (16, l i , . . . ,ii) . When it receives a digest, it will look for h(lb), h ( l { ) , (l,,,-~) . Id the mobile computer finds some i and j for which h(Z:) = h(13) then it will read the message from cell j of the liable.
Mobile computers can read messages from the message service in one of two ways. If the label that it wishes to read is private and the computer trusts the message sender (or the message sender does not know the identity of the recipient), then it can send a request to one of the servers containing the pair ( 2 , ) ) where i is the number of the table to be read and j is the number of the cell within that table which contains the message. If the label to be read is public or if the mobile computer does not trust the message sender, then it must use the blinded read operation from section 7. The mobile computer will create t + 1 bit-vectors of length m and send each bit-vector, along with the number of the table to read, to a different message server. Since mobile computers can not read from tables until after they are filled (i.e. after the last write operation has completed), the request messages do not need to be bundled and the totally ordered multicast protocol is not needed.
Choosing a hash function
If the hash function, h, used in creating message digests is the identity function then there will never be a case where h(l:) = h(lj) but 2: # Zj. This means that only mobile computers which have messages intended for them in a table will read from that table. Since an attacker can determine the location from which the mobile computers read from the table, an attacker may gain useful information about computers' locations if m is small. If m can not be made large enough to sufficiently confuse an attacker, then a hash function must be chosen which will force some mobile computers to read messages from the table that were not intended for them.
Suppose, for example, that the total number of message labels in which every mobile computer is interested is 64,000. If we choose a hash function, h, which maps message labels to values between 0 and 31,999, then there will be, on average, two message labels which hash to each value. If m = 1024, then there will be approximately 2048 requests made to the message service. Of these, 1024 will be from the intended recipients of the messages in the table and 1024 will be from randomly chosen mobile computers. Thus, an attacker seeing a mobile computer read a message from the table will know that there is only a 50% chance that the computer is the intended recipient of one of the messages in the table.
Garbage collection
In an infinite run of the system, an infinite number of messages will be sent to the message service. It is, therefore, essential to have some mechanism for removing old messages from the system. Ideally, a message should be deleted after it has been read by its intended recipient. However, since computers may retrieve messages anonymously, the message service may not know when this has happened.
An approximate solution is to delete messages after some period of time A has passed. In our system, a table is left intact until its newest message has been in the system for time A at which point the entire table is deleted. If A is chosen properly, then every computer will have sufficient time to retrieve all messages intended for it while the number of tables stored in the system at any one time is manageable.
In some cases, a computer will be disconnected from the network for a long period of time. This can happen if the computer moves outside of the range of all of the base stations or if the computer is turned of€ to conserve battery power. If the computer is disconnected for too long then it may miss some of the messages that were sent to it. In order to avoid this, we have developed a vacation service.
A computer which is concerned about losing messages while it is disconnected from the network registers with the vacation service by sending it a list of message labels in which it is interested. If the vacation service does not receive a message from a registered computer within some specified period of time y < A, then the vacation service will begin to check the message service for messages with any of the specified labels and will store a local copy of those messages.
When the mobile computer next contacts the vacation service, the vacation service will send any messages that it stored for the mobile computer to the message service and will then stop looking for any new messages for that computer. The mobile computer can then read the messages from the message service as usual.
In order to prevent the vacation service from using the registration messages to locate the user, the mobile computer should use the techniques which were described in section 6 to hide the locations from which it, sends the messages.
Ending a conversation
Until this point, we have treated a conversation as a sequence of messages with a beginning but with no end. In practice, most conversations will only last for a short period of time. Many other conversations will be sporadic in nature, with periods of high message traffic followed by long periods with no traffic. Since a mobile computer, for each conversation, must store label and key information and check every table digest for a message, it is inefficient to have a large number of conversations when most of them are inactive.
One technique for solving this problem is for computers to explicitly end conversations by including an "end of conversation" marker in a message instead of a return "address" label. After sending this message, the sender can erase from its memory any information about the conversation and the recipient can do the same upon receipt of the message.
An alternative is to use return "address" labels with expiration times. If the recipient does not send a message using the label before the label expires, then the sender will consider the conversation t o have ended. If the recipient wishes to send a message after the expiration time, it can begin a new conversation by sending an initiation message. In order to have labels with expiration times, it is necessary to have synchronized clocks. This can be accomplished through the use of a time service. The details of clock synchronization and its use are beyond the scope of this paper. An overview of the subject can be found in [21] .
Performance
In this section, we will discuss the overhead that is associated with the operations of sending and retrieving messages in a secure manner. The primary costs associated with this privacy scheme are the cryptographic operations. In computing our cost estimates we will primarily use the performance figures from [9] . This paper describes the implementation of RSA [IS] and DES [lo] using a Motorola DSP56000 along with a Western Digital WD20C03 DES chip.
Mobile computers
There are a few basic cryptographic operations that are needed by the mobile computers. The computer needs to create random numbers for use a . i bit-vectors, DES keys, and as padding in RSA encr,yption. The most secure technique for creating random data is to use a noise circuit, however, using a pseudo-random number generator can be less costly. Using a noise circuit, random data can be created at the rate of 81.9 ms/KByte. In addition, mobile computers need to encrypt and decrypt messages using RSA and DES. Estimates for the costs of these operations ran be found in figure 7.
When sending a message, the message must first be encrypted using the DES session key for the conversation (2.2 ms/KByte). Then, if the message is to be sent through the MIX-network, the message must be encrypted for t + 1 MIXes. For each MIX, 512 bits of random data must be created (a DES key along with some padding for the RSA encryption), the message must be encrypted with the DES key, and the DES key must be encrypted with the public key of the MIX. Using the estimates from figure 7, this will take 6.1 (non-init ) message then a DES session key must be created for the conversation and encrypted with the public key of the intended recipient (along with random padding). This will cost 6.1 ms. If the initiation message includes authentication information then a signature must be created which will cost 44 ms + 2.2ms/KByte (using DES to create a message digest). In order to read a message using the blinded read operation, t random bit-vectors must be created.
Then t + 1 bit-vectors must be encrypted and sent to message servers. The responses from the message servers must then be decrypted. For a table with 1024 entries, 15362 + 512 bits of random data must be created (1024t for the random bit-vectors and 512(t+ I) for the DES keys and random padding). This will take (15.4t + 5.1) ms. Encrypting the bit-vectors will take 0.3(t + 1) ms and encrypting the DES keys will take l.O(t+l) ms. Decrypting the responses from the message servers will take 2.2(t + 1 ) ms/KByte. Once the responses from the message servers have been cornbined, the computed message must be decrypted. This will take 2.2 ms/KByte. If the received message is an initiation message then the session key must be extracted which will take 44 ms. If the initiation message also includes authentication information, then 2 ms + 2.2 ms/KByte are needed to verify the sender's public key certificate and to verify the signature.
Since many of the computations listed above do not depend on the message being sent or received, time may be saved by precomputing data. For both sending and receiving messages, the random data can be precomputed as well as the DES keys for the message servers and MIXes. In addition, since t of the t + 1 bit-vectors used to read from the message service are random, they can be encrypted in advance. Figure 6 shows the estimated costs for a few values of t. In each box, the top line represents to total amount of computation that needs to be performed and the bottom line represents the amount that can be precomputed.
Servers
When a server (either a MIX or a message server) receives a message, it must decrypt the message. This involves using RSA decryption t o extract the DES key and then using the DES key to extract the message. Since the servers will specialize in handling message requests, it is reasonable to assume that they will have special purpose hardware for RSA decryption as well as DES encryption and decryption. In [19], Shand and Vuillemin describe an RSA chip which can perform 512-bit decryption in under 1 ms. Using this chip along with the DES chip used in [9] , messages can be decrypted in 1 ms + 2.2 ms/KByte. In the case of the message servers, the responses must be encrypted adding 2.2 ms/KByte.
Conclusions
We have presented a set of protocols which work together to preserve privacy for users of mobile computers. A major concern in designing such protocols is the limited computing power of the mobile computers. In our approach, the computing costs of each of the protocols can be dynamically tuned by each of the mobile computers based on the amount of computing power available and the degree of any perceived threat to privacy. In addition, the protocols were designed to place most of the computational burden on the servers which cm use specialized hardware in order to perform t,he necessary operations quickly.
We are in the process of extending the Horus architecture [22] to support secure and private mobile communication. In the future, we will use this system t o experiment with the techniques presented in this paper and hope to report on our experiences in future papers.
